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Babbitt v. Brandeis: The Decline of the
Professional Ideal
William H. Simon*
The vision of professionalism that entranced the liberal legal
elite for a century now strikes most lawyers and law students as
implausible or uninteresting or both. The papers in this symposium by Robert Nelson and by Ronald Gilson and Robert
Mnookin' are outstanding examples of two of the current modes
of repudiation of this vision: the mode of skepticism and the
mode of indifference. Nelson takes the claims of the professional
vision seriously, and, using a methodology responsive to them,
sets out to refute them. Gilson and Mnookin ignore the vision,
and, using a methodology that assumes the vision's invalidity,
construct a radically different account of law practice.
I want to rehearse some of the themes of the professional vision and compare them to the contrasting ones sounded by these
critics. I do not propose exactly to rehabilitate the professional
vision. In part, I am prompted simply by the thought that, in case
this symposium should prove its final burial, the vision should
have some memorial here. I am also prompted by a sense that
some of its themes may be more valuable or more resilient than
the critics allow.
I.

THE PROGRESSIVE-FUNCTIONALIST VISION

The dominant account of professionalism in the past century
can be called the Progressive-Functionalist Vision. Its most influential expositors have been the Progressive lawyer Louis Brandeis and the functionalist sociologist Talcott Parsons. The vision
was elaborated by Brandeis in a series of articles during the first
two decades of this century and by Parsons in strikingly parallel
*

Associate Professor of Law, Stanford University.

1. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and ProfessionalAutonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1985); Gilson & Mnookin, SharingAmong
the Human Capitalists:An Economic Inquiry Into the CorporateLaw Firm and How PartnersSplit
Profits, 37 STAN. L. REv. 313 (1985).
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but independently conceived articles during the 1930s through
the 1950s. 2

This vision is still expressed or presupposed

throughout the Code of Professional Responsibility.3
The Progressives and the Functionalists reacted against both
the social system of the self-regulating market and the doctrines
of classical liberalism that they associated with that system.
Those doctrines, which today survive most vigorously in the style
of economic analysis practiced by Gilson and Mnookin, accounted for society in terms of the principles of atomistic individualism and order through impersonal rule. The basic vision was
one of selfish individuals pursuing material advantage constrained only by the coercive enforcement of the legal rules constituting the market. To the Progressives and the Functionalists,
this vision was both inaccurate and repulsive, inaccurate because
it ignored the most fundamental mechanisms of social order and
repulsive because, to the extent that it did describe society, that
society was economically inefficient and morally stultifying.
The first premise of the Progressive-Functionalist Vision was
normative integration. Classical liberalism was wrong in suggesting that social order could ever be achieved simply through
the coercive enforcement of impersonal rules. Viewing individuals in purely egoistic terms, it ignored more fundamental modes
of social order: socialization and honor. Socialization refers to
the process by which people internalize as their own goals and
values the norms of the general moral order of their society.
Honor refers to the process by which people seek to conform to
the expectations of others in order to gain their approval or solidarity. Each process makes possible a more spontaneous, flexible, and less alienating mode of social coordination than does a
regime of impersonal rule. Such a regime is at best a supplement
to the shared goals and expectations that provide the most fun2. L. BRANDEIS, Business-A Profession, in BUSINESS-A PROFESSION 1 (1914); L.
BRANDEIS, The Opportunity In The Law, in BUSINESS-A PROFESSION 313 (1914); Brandeis,
The Living Law, 10 ILL. L. REV. 461 (1916). T. PARSONS, The Professionsand Social Structure,
in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 34 (rev. ed. 1954); T. PARSONS, The Motivation of
EconomicActivities, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 50 (rev. ed. 1954); T. PARSONS, An
AnalyticalApproach to the Theory of Social Stratification, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
69 (rev. ed. 1954); T. PARSONS, A Sociologist Looks At The Legal Profession, in ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 370 (rev. ed. 1954). A full account of Brandeis' Progressivism
and Parsons' Functionalism would mention the many differences between their visions
as well as the parallels I emphasize here.
3. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979) [hereinafter cited as
MODEL CODE].
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damental social cohesion.4
The second premise of the Progressive-Functionalist view was
functional differentiation. Roles requiring extensive specialized
training and skills proliferate in modem social systems. One
consequence of this fact is that identity is increasingly defined by
occupational role. This phenomenon makes the classical liberal
focus on the atomistic individual all the more unsatisfactory. An
adequate account of social order should not portray people as
fungible monads; instead it should look to the way that roles differentiate people's attitudes and orientations and cluster them in
occupationally defined organizations. The premise of functional
differentiation qualifies the premise of normative integration in
an important way. If an important part of a person's identity is
formed in connection with occupational role, then an important
part of the process of normative integration must occur within
the occupational group and must involve values and goals peculiar to the specialized knowledge and skills that define the role.
Thus, in addition to the primary socialization that orients people
to the goals and values shared throughout the larger society,
there is a secondary socialization that orients them to the distinctive normative culture of the occupational group.5 In addition to
the tendency of people to seek a general approval from and solidarity with their neighbors and others, there is a tendency to seek
a denser approval from and solidarity with peers in the occupational group.
The occupations that most correspond to this understanding
of social order are the elite professions. The Progressives and
the Functionalists saw the professions as the central institutions
of modem society. They thought that the society would become
4. See

MODEL CODE,

supra note 3, Preamble:

Each lawyer must find within his own conscience the touchstone against which
to test the extent to which his actions should rise above minimum standards.
But in the last analysis it is the desire for the respect and confidence of the
members of his profession and of the society which he serves that should provide to a lawyer the incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical conduct.
The possible loss of that respect and confidence is the ultimate sanction.
One prominent manifestation of the theme of normative integration in the Model
Code is the pervasive assumption that "respect for law" and "confidence in the legal
system," rather than merely coercive enforcement, are essential to legal order. See, e.g.,
id. at EC 9-2.
5. Thus, the Model Code justifies the prohibitions of unauthorized practice and lay
intermediaries in part on the ground that lay people have not been socialized into the
professional moral culture. See id. at EC 2-33, 3-3 to 3-8, 5-23, 5-24.
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increasingly professionalized. In the professions, both the need
for and the possibilities of the kind of order that the Progressives
and Functionalists emphasized seems greatest. The need is
greatest because the specialized nature of the professional disciplines makes them insusceptible to control through either the
market or government regulation. Clients are vulnerable, and lay
officials are incompetent to evaluate practice.6 The possibilities
are greatest because the professional disciplines are relatively intellectually complex and morally charged with important values
such as health and justice. These characteristics create possibilities for an occupational culture rich enough to engage and to
stimulate its participants.
In the Progressive-Functionalist model of the professional
role, the most important determinants of the professional's behavior are not self-interest and coercively enforced rules but the
goals of perfecting and applying her discipline and, through that
discipline, serving clients and society. This orientation is altruistic and idealistic, but it is not a matter of saintliness or self-sacrifice; it merely reflects the fact that the professional has been led
to define her own goals in ways that mesh with those of the occupational group and the larger society. The Progressive-Functionalist model does not entirely deny individual material interests.
The notion of an altruistic, idealistic moral orientation is subject
to an important qualification: that the professions be organized
so as to immunize their members from certain commercial pressures and to guarantee them a secure threshold of material welfare. 7 Satisfaction of these baseline material interests is a
precondition of professional culture.
The classical liberal or economic vision can be distinguished
from the Progressive-Functionalist one in terms of methodological and substantive premises or emphases. An important methodological focus of the former is behaviorist; it directs attention
to how people act, rather than to their attitudes and beliefs. On
the other hand, the methodological focus of the Progessive-Functionalist Vision directs attention to attitudes and beliefs and to
the processes by which they are acquired. The substantive distinction is that the classical liberal or economic vision tends to
presume or anticipate a selfish, materialistic moral orientation,
while the Progressive-Functionalist one tends to presume or an6. See id. at EG 3-3, 3-4, 3-8.
7. See text accompanying note 35 infra.
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ticipate an altruistic, idealistic one.' However, in both visions,
these substantive emphases often involve an ambiguity. Sometimes the substantive moral premises appear as descriptive accounts or scientific hypotheses, but sometimes they appear more
as ideal than as description. And perhaps most often the line between description and ideal is hard to draw.
Professional culture appears most frequently and explicitly as
an ideal in the writings of the Progressives. They advanced professionalism as both a scientific project and a project of political
and cultural transformation. They attacked classicism as both
bad social science and the emblem of a degraded, stultifying culture. Brandeis himself served as an exemplar of the professional
ideal for many Progressives who took his exploits as inspiration
for a reformed legal role and culture.
The Progressives had more than one interpretation of the enemy culture of selfish materialism. Sometimes it was identified
with the decadent, bellicose style of the robber baron plutocracy. 9 But perhaps the most powerful portrayal of the enemy culture associated it with the petite bourgeoisie. This portrayal
occurs in the novels of the Progressive writer Sinclair Lewis. The
protagonist of Lewis's Babbitt incarnates the enemy culture.
Although Babbitt mouths the rhetoric of professionalism, his basic belief is that "the one purpose of the real estate business [is]
He views his own
to make money for George F. Babbitt."'
knowledge and his relations with clients as assets to be exploited
for their maximum financial return. He pursues his material self8. Of course, this distinction is much oversimplified. For one thing, it ignores the
fact that both liberal economics and functionalist sociology often adopt a relatively formal or abstract perspective that tries to cut across distinctions such as that between
selfishness and altruism. Thus selfishness may give way to minimal rationality in pursuit
of whatever goals the individual happens to have; altruism can be diluted to mean simply
orientation toward norms or toward others. In this manner, the substantive distinctions
between the two approaches can be collapsed. See T. PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION 43-74 (1949). At other times, however, economists and sociologists apply
narrower and more controversial notions of moral orientation. This is true of Nelson
and of Gilson and Mnookin. The hypothesis that Nelson tests imputes to lawyers a
sense of public responsibility that implies a far stronger notion of altruism than simply
norm-orientation or other-direction. On the other hand, Gilson and Mnookin's explicit
premise of "rational maximization of tangible reward," supra note 1, at 376, clearly
means something like selfish materialism. The entire problem that Gilson and Mnookin
pose-"sharing among the human capitalists"-only isa problem from a perspective
that assumes that people do not share for other than selfish, material reasons, and the
solution they offer is to show that such sharing is compatible with selfish materialism.

9. See T. VEBLEN,

THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS

10. S. LEWIS, BABBITT 42 (1922).

(1912).
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interest regardless of the consequences to his clients and the
public-interest. Even without the benefit of the portfolio and
agency theories that inspire the Gilson-Mnookin article, Lewis
emphasized in his characters some of the personal traits to which
these theories draw attention. Babbitt is risk averse and obsessively distrustful of his subordinates. Professionalism to him is
part hypocrisy and part expression of a boundless capacity to delude himself that his own material self-interest invariably coincides with the interests of others.
Babbitt's limited education and status prevent him from articulating his world view in a way that might challenge the professional ideal in the language of science. But in Arrowsmith, Lewis'
novel about the medical profession, Lewis produced a character
who aspired to defend the enemy cultural ideal in the specialized
scientific discourse of the professions themselves. The character
is Dr. Roscoe Geake, who finds his vocation upon leaving a medical professorship for the presidency of the New Idea Medical Instrument and Furniture Company. His farewell address to his
students defends the antiprofessional ideal:
Now that I am leaving this field where I have labored so long
and happily, I want to ask every man jack of you to read, before
you begin to practise medicine, not merely your Rosenau and
Howell and Gray, but also, as a preparation for being that
which all good citizens must be, namely, practical men, a most
valuable little manual of modern psychology, "How to Put Pep
in Salesmanship," by Grosvenor A. Bibby. For don't forget,
gentlemen, and this is my last message to you, the man worth
while . . . instead of day-dreaming and spending all his time

talking about "ethics," splendid though they are, and "charity,"
glorious virtue though that be, yet he never forgets that unfortunately the world judges a man by the amount of good hard
cash he can lay away.
Geake's particular fascination was the type of activity Gilson and
2
Mnookin call "signaling":'
And from a scientific standpoint, don't overlook the fact that
the impression of a properly remunerated competence which
you make on a patient is of just as much importance, in these
days of the new psychology, as the drugs you get into him or
the operations he lets you get away with . . . . I don't care
whether [a doctor] has . . . the surgical technique of a Mayo, a

Crile, a Blake, an Ochsner, a Cushing. If he has a dirty old of11.

S. LEwis, ARROWSMITH 85 (1925).

12. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 1, at 362.
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fice, with hand-me-down chairs and a lot of second-hand
magazines, then the patient isn't going to have confidence in
him; he is going to resist the treatment-and the doctor is going 1to
have difficulty in putting over and collecting an adequate
3
fee.
Although Dr. Geake thinks of himself as cutting through the
pretensions of professional idealism to get to the hard truth of
practice, Lewis portrays him as parading pretensions of his own.
Dr. Geake glamorizes in the language of science what Lewis considers the prostitution of knowledge and the exploitation of clients. In works such as Lewis', the moral and political dimensions
of the professional ideal are prominent and explicit. In works
such as Parsons', they are at best implicit; scientific language and
goals take the forefront. Nelson and Gilson and Mnookin adopt
this scientific perspective and are concerned with professionalism
as a descriptive hypothesis. Yet in both Parsons' case and theirs,
I think it ultimately proves difficult to interpret their efforts apart
from the moral and political struggle between competing cultural
ideals. 14
II.

NELSON:

Do

LAWYERS REGULATE THEIR CLIENTS?

Nelson takes the Progressive-Functionalist Vision seriously.
He derives the hypothesis that he tests-that lawyers play a regulatory role with regard to their clients-from the basic Functionalist tenets; he focuses attention in the same direction as the
Vision-on attitudes and beliefs; and he uses a favorite Functionalist methodology: the survey.
The picture of the ethos of the corporate bar that emerges
from Nelson's survey is one of centrist tolerance toward government and business, mildly conservative reformism toward the
legal system, and acquiescence in the specific projects of business
clients. On a general level, Nelson's lawyers are content with
both big business and the welfare-regulatory state and have difficulty imagining any but marginal improvements in either. (Indeed, they appear to have difficulty imagining even marginal
improvements. Although Nelson invited them to suggest up to
three desirable reforms, few respondents suggested more than
13. S. LEwis, supra note 11, at 85-86. Though it exalts the professional ideal, Arrowsmth is extremely pessimistic about the political prospects of the ideal.
14. On the implicit moral and political commitments in Parsons' work, see A.
GOULDNER, THE COMING CRISIS OF WESTERN SOCIOLOGY

246-338 (1970).
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one.15 ) Most of the reforms the lawyers suggest reflect a solicitude for business. (But they show no great support for the radical probusiness deregulatory reforms sponsored by Reaganites
and Chicagoites.) The nonlegal advice that they give to clients
appears to be of a mundane, pragmatic sort. Nelson's most striking finding is that the great majority of the lawyers surveyed have
never been asked by a client to undertake a project that was contrary to their own values. In the few cases in which people have
been asked to undertake such projects, the conflict most often
arose because the project plainly violated the law, rather than because it threatened moral or policy commitments.' 6
Nelson acknowledges limitations and ambiguities in his
data,1 7 but his picture of the ethos of the contemporary corporate
bar seems quite plausible to me. I want to focus on the significance that Nelson attributes to his findings in the light of the Progressive-Functionalist Vision. Nelson believes that he has
refuted the Vision. He suggests that one implication of the Vision is that lawyers play a regulatory role in regard to their clients
by rechanneling client projects that conflict with important social
goals or values. Since his survey indicates that, at least on the
level of specific projects, lawyers' own values and goals are usually compatible with those of their clients, they could not play
such a regulatory role.
I think that the Progressive-Fundamentalist Vision is immune
to this type of critique. Looking at only one dimension of it, Nelson treats it as coherent but inaccurate. Considered as a whole,
however, the Vision is internally contradictory but, in a limited
sense, accurate. It is accurate in the sense that its conflicting
premises express a deep, long-standing ambivalence among elite
legal professionals.
Nelson derives his hypothesis about the regulatory role of the
profession from the premise of functional differentiation. Because law is complex and differentiated, it is relatively inaccessible to lay people both in the sense that it is hard for them to learn
and in the sense that they are not spontaneously disposed to
comply with it. The job of the lawyer, who knows the law and is
spontaneously disposed toward compliance, is to teach the client
and to encourage him to comply. The lawyer is in a better posi15. Nelson, supra note 1, at 521.
16. Id. at 535.
17. Id. at 536.
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tion to do so than is the government bureaucrat because the lawyer can establish a relation of relative trust and intimacy with the
client that enables the lawyer to relate abstract legal principles to
the client's concrete circumstances, to detect incipient deviance,
and to persuade the client. 8
The problem with this idea is that it contradicts important implications of the other major premise of the Progressive-Functionalist vision: normative integration, the notion that
individuals and the various specialized roles in the society are
held together by a general moral culture. In modem society, law
is the most important component of this normative adhesive.
Law is supposed to legitimate collective activity by enabling citizens to perceive it as an expression of norms that they recognize
as their own. The dimension of universality is central to modern
law.' 9 Thus, while the premise of functional differentiation implies a divergence between legal and lay moral orientations, the
premise of normative integration implies a convergence. Law as
the basis of the occupational culture of the legal profession appears as specialized and accessible only through elaborate training and initiation; law as the basis of the general moral order
appears as universal.20
This is a problem for any legal or social theory that would
vindicate both the claim of law to universality and the claim of
the legal elite to specialized competence. Marx pointed it out in
his critique of Hegel's vision of the civil service as a "universal
class." The role that law plays in the general moral culture
18. See T. PARSONS, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, supra note 2, at 378-81.
19. See T. PARSONS, Evolutionary Universals in Society, in SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY AND
MODERN Socizry"510-14 (1967).
20. Why can't the problem be resolved by asserting that law is only superficially
differentiated and becomes transparent and authoritative to lay citizens through the mediating efforts of lawyers? This is a weaker notion of differentiation than the one Nelson

tests, since he interprets differentiation to imply deviant client goals that persist even
after the lawyer's mediating efforts. This revised version is probably compatible with
Nelson's survey results, but it runs up against a variety of criticisms. For one thing, the
revised version ignores both important aspects of the legal culture that seem to imply
that citizens do or should have immediate understanding of the law-for example, the
principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse-and the fact that most people do not
have substantial access to legal assistance. A second type of criticism asserts that it is not

possible to define a coherent and plausible body of legal discourse differentiated from
nonprofessional forms of moral and political discourse. See Unger, The Critical Legal
Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 567-76 (1983). A third type of criticism denies
that, where clients do find the legal culture alien, lawyers in fact mediate so as to make it
accessible to them. See Blumberg, The Practiceof Law As Confidence Game, 4 LAw & Soc'v
REV. 15 (1967).
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makes its status as a specialized discipline uniquely problematical. The fact that other disciplines are not immediately accessible
to lay people merely reflects the finitude of the individual life.
But the fact that the law is not so accessible condemns the citizen
to alienation from the experience of justice that law promises
him. 2 '
This theoretical problem corresponds to a tradition of ambivalence toward business among elite professionals. At times, professional institutions and ideologies have served as bases for
some nonbusiness elites to attack or at least dissociate themselves from business elites. 22 At other times, however, the professional mood has been one of more uniform solidarity with
business. In moods of intra-elite tension, the theme of a differentiated legal culture may fuel a sense of moral emancipation or
superiority on the part of professionals. At other times, the
theme of a universal legal culture may express a sense of intra
elite solidarity. Both postures can be found in the work of Brandeis and Parsons. Brandeis was a famous critic of business, and
his famous struggles with his business clients are the paradigm of
the notion of the lawyer-as-regulator that Nelson invokes. 23 Parsons emphasized the role 'strain' that lawyers would experience
as a result of the divergence between their values and those of
their clients. 24 Yet both Brandeis and Parsons thought that business would itself evolve to a state of professionalism, a state in
which, through socialization and a sense of honor, business people would spontaneously comply with the values and goals of the
larger society.2 5 In this state, the lawyer's role as regulator would
become obsolete.
21. In a rational state it would be more appropriate to ensure that a cobbler
passed an examination than an executive civil servant; because shoe-making is a
craft in the absence of which it is still possible to be a good citizen and a man in
society. But the necessary 'knowledge of the state' is a precondition in the absence of which one lives outside the state [i.e., general moral order], cut off
from the air one breathes and from oneself.
K. MARX, Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State, in EARLY WRrTNGS 112

(Q.

Hoare ed.

1975).
22. R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 148-63 (1955); see also L. AuCHINCLOSS,
THE PARTNERS 112 (1973) ("The law was what the church had been in the Middle Ages:

the only ladder available for the elevation of the reflective, the introspective, the noncompetitive in a society of brigands.").
23. See generally A. MASON, BRANDEIS-A FREE MAN'S LIFE (1946).
24. T. PARSONS, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, supra note 2, at 378.
25. See, e.g., L. BRANDEIS, Business-A Profession, supra note 2; T. PARSONS, The Professions and Social Structure, supra note 2.
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From the point of view of functional differentiation, Nelson's
findings are, as he suggests, troubling to the Progressive-Functionalist Vision. But from the point of view of normative integration, they come as a relief. They can be interpreted to indicate
that the larger project of integration is being perfected, that the
society does in fact share a common moral culture. Had Nelson's
findings been otherwise, they would have fueled concerns about
lawyer elitism or alienation from the general moral culture.2 6
Moreover, if Nelson had discovered a distinctive set of professional commitments, these commitments would in all likelihood
be recognized, not as an expression of "social needs" or an uncontroversial "public interest," but as a particular political program, most probably the center liberal regulatory-welfare
program of the Progressives, the New Deal, and the liberal legislation of the 1960s and early 1970s. At least since World War II,
when the Progressive-Functionalist literature has talked about
lawyers' ethical autonomy, it usually has had in mind a commitment to this program.2 7 When it has spoken of a regulatory role
for lawyers, it has usually meant a role in enforcing this body of
legislation. The typical illustration involves the lawyer's effort to
prevent the client from thwarting a Progressive or New Deal statute. (The examples given by practitioners at the Symposium of
circumstances in which they or colleagues had played a regulatory role involved the Sherman Act and the securities acts.)
From this perspective, one might ask whether the absence of
divergence between client goals and lawyer values that Nelson
finds may be a more transitory phenomenon than he suggests.
Perhaps his results simply reflect the collapse of liberal reformism in the past few years and the relative paralysis of center liber26. See, e.g., Krash, Professional Responsibility to Clients and the Public Interest.- Is There A
Conflict?, 55 Cm. B. REC. (n.s.) 31 (1974) (suggesting that it would be elitist for lawyers
to claim a better understanding of the "public interest" than that of nonlawyers).
27. See Berle, Book Review, 76 HARV. L. REv. 430, 431-33 (1962) (reviewing B.
LEVY, CORPORATE LAWYER . . . SAINT OR SINNER? THE NEW ROLE OF THE LAWYER IN
MODERN SOCIETY (1961)); J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 355-56 (1950).

The other major candidate as a substantive basis for a differentiated legal ethic is concern with the integrity of legal procedure. With the notable exception of Lon Fuller, see
L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LIW (1964), most Progressives and Functionalists seem not
to have been attracted to this option. One reason may be that, even broadly conceived,
proceduralism is so bound up with litigation that it seems inapplicable to the vast range
of nonlitigation practice. Another reason may be that proceduralism was at least partially discredited by its use in the conservative resistance to the New Deal when it became associated among Progressives with irresponsible, antisocial business behavior.
See Arnold, Trial by Combat and the New Deal, 47 HARV. L. REV. 913 (1934).
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alism before the claims of business. The moral orientation that
Nelson describes of deference to established welfare and regulatory institutions, moderately probusiness reformism, and acquiescence in most of the specific projects of business pretty much
describes the program of most liberal politicians these days. At
least for the moment, the collapse of liberal reformism has made
it harder for corporate lawyers to give substance to whatever
longings they may have for autonomy from their clients.28
III.

GILSON AND MNOOKIN: ARE LAWYERS AND CLIENTS
COMMODITIES?

Gilson and Mnookin focus on a phenomenon that they describe as "sharing": Income is distributed within many corporate
law firms in ways that disregard the marginal productivity of individual partners, often in "lock-step seniority" patterns. They
summon the language of economics, first to define this phenomenon as problematical, and then to resolve the problem. It is an
indication of the decline of the Progressive-Functionalist Vision
that Gilson and Mnookin never refer to its account of their subject, even though much of the account is implicit in the Code of
ProfessionalResponsibility. The Progressive-Functionalist answer to

the question of why income is not divided in accordance with
marginal productivity is-in a phrase-that lawyers do not regard
themselves or their clients as commodities.29
In the Progressive-Functionalist Vision, the lawyer-client
transaction has a "fiduciary and personal character.""0 It is not
defined by arm's length bargaining or by the impersonal forces of
a market. It is a relation in which the lawyer's preeminent con28. In Louis Auchincloss' novel, The Partners,the central character, who stands for

both the professional ideal and New Deal politics, is sexually-and one assumes, symbolically-impotent. See L. AuCHINCLOSS, supra note 22.
29. The principle that clients are not commodities is most frequently expressed in
connection with the prohibition of the sale of a practice, that is, the "good will" constituted by the lawyer's relations with her clients. Dwyer v.jung, 133 NJ. Super. 343, 346,
336 A.2d 498, 499 (1975) ("A lawyer's clients are neither chattels nor merchandise
.... ");H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHics 189 (1953) ("A lawyer's clients are not merchandise,
nor is a law practice the subject of barter."); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and
Grievances, Formal Op. 266 (1945) ("The good will of the practice of a lawyer is not,
however, of itself an asset, which . . he . . .can sell.").
For an illustration of the related principle that lawyers are not commodities, see
MODEL CODE, supra note 3, at DR 2-102 (lawyer may not license his name for use in
connection with the practice of another).
30. MODEL CODE, supra note 3, at EC 3-1.
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cerns are not material self-interest, but the client's welfare and
the public interest. For her part, the client does not view lawyering as a commodity to be shopped for.
The notion of the lawyer-client interaction as a relationship
and as a matter of personal service underpins a variety of
precepts designed to inhibit its commercialization. For example,
the Code of Professional Responsibility discourages the lawyer from
investing in the client's activities. The rule expresses concerns
that negotiating for a commercial interest with the client will preclude disinterested loyalty to her, and that pursuing such an interest with the client will preclude disinterested loyalty to the
public in handling the client's affairs.3 1 Another such precept
holds that the lawyer may ask compensation from the client only
on the basis of "the services performed and the responsibility assumed. 3' 2 This precept traditionally is interpreted to preclude
33
taking a fee merely for referring the client to another lawyer.
The underlying belief is that taking a fee in these circumstances is
like treating the client's trust in the referring lawyer as an asset of
the lawyer on which he might earn a return. The Code also requires the lawyer to charge the client only on the basis of the
"reasonable" value of the lawyer's services.3 4 Unlike "market
value," "reasonable value" is not primarily a function of self-interested dealing and the vicissitudes of supply and demand. It
connotes a relatively stable set of distributive social norms that
rank different types of activities and occupations. The norms express a vision of a hierarchical social order regarded as intrinsically valuable. People conform their economic behavior to these
norms because in doing so, they reproduce an order to which
31. Id. at EC 5-2 to 5-8.
32. Id. at EC 2-22.
33. MODEL CODE, supra note 3, at EC 2-22. The principle would seem to preclude
compensation for "rain-making," or other client-getting activities within a firm, but the
currently operative rule in the Code exempts intrafirm referrals. Id. at DR 2-107. The
exemption for intrafirm referrals is sometimes said to rest on the fact that the referring
lawyer "remains vicariously liable for the work of his or her partners." Morgan, The
Evoh,ing Concept of ProfessionalResponsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702, 720 (1977). However,
this explanation seems unresponsive to the concerns of the rule which, when applicable,
requires that compensation be proportional to the "responsibility assumed by each"

lawyer. Since the rule permits any referring lawyer to charge a fee commensurate with
any vicarious liability assumed (e.g., his pro rata share of the portion of the firm's malpractice insurance premium allocable to the new case), the blanket intrafirm exemption
is unnecessary to deal with this concern, and, of course, it allows intrafirm referrers to
charge far more than the amount necessary to compensate them for such responsibility.
34. MODEL CODE, supra note 3, at EC 2-17, DR 2-106.

578

STANFORD LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 37:565

they are committed. Among occupational groups, the principal
norm is merit (itself a bundle of ascriptive and achievement-oriented criteria); within occupational groups, the principal criterion is seniority.3 5 To say that the price of a service reflects its
"reasonable value" is to say that it accurately reflects the relative
position of the activities and actors involved in the occupational
hierarchy defined by such norms.
This Vision does not ignore or deny material self-interest.
However, it treats this orientation as partial and discontinuous.
It supposes that there is a socially determined threshold of material well-being that must be met before the altruistic, idealistic
orientation of professionalism becomes possible. 6 Only when
this threshold is guaranteed can there be confidence that the
ideal of the professional service relation can be implemented.
Moreover, this threshold must be achieved in ways that do not
subject the professional to impersonal, competitive market pressures. The professional's capacity for responsibility to clients
and the public and for peer solidarity are eroded by the experience of impersonal competition and enhanced by the experience
of material security.
One way that the Progressive-Functionalist Vision proposes
to satisfy this material prerequisite to professionalism is through
an institutional structure that accords professionals a panoply of
exemptions from the general regime of the market. These exemptions would inhibit competition through restrictions on entry
into the profession, prohibitions of price-cutting (charging less
than "reasonable value"), and limitations on advertising and solicitation.3 7 However, the attainment both of the threshold and
of the other aspects of the professional ideal depends more fun35. See T. PARSONS, An Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification, supra
note 2, at 78-79. For survey evidence concerning such criteria, see Alves & Rossi, Who
Should Get What? FairnessJudgments of the Distribution of Earnings,84 AM.J. Soc. 541 (1978).
For arguments that these criteria explain important economic behavior more adequately
than do neoclassical economic models, see L. THUROW, GENERATING INEQUALITY: MECHANISMS OF DISTRIBUTION IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 104-13 (1975); UNEMPLOYMENT AND INFLATION: INSTITUTIONAL AND STRUCTURALIST VIEWS 63-154 (M. Piore ed. 1979).

36. See, e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 3, at EC 2-17 ("adequate compensation is
necessary in order to enable the lawyer to serve his client effectively and to preserve the
integrity and independence of the profession").
37. See MODEL CODE, supra note 3, Canon 2. The Supreme Court struck down
more extensive restrictions on price competition under the Sherman Act, see Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), and on advertising and solicitation under the
First Amendment, see Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), each time rejecting Progressive-Functionalist arguments advanced in favor of the restrictions.
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damentally on the fact that the notion of the lawyer-client transaction as a personal relation densely implicated in a legitimate
background social structure is widely shared throughout the society. Neither lawyers nor clients act as they would in a market
because they share, to some extent, the values and expectations
of the professional ideal.
The problem of "sharing" that Gilson and Mnookin confront
when they portray lawyers as "human capitalists" and their relations with clients as market relations simply never arises in the
Progressive-Functionalist Vision. For one thing, "sharing" is not
anomalous within the Vision. More fundamentally, the distributive pattern in question can only be characterized as "sharing" by
reference to a baseline measure-marginal productivity-that
has no meaning in the Progressive-Functionalist Vision. In that
vision, the "lock-step seniority-based" system is an expression of
the notion that seniority is an important criterion of desert, of the
principle of compensation for the "reasonable" value of service,
and perhaps of the goal of insuring disinterested service by securing a threshold of material welfare. Moreover, the phenomena of "grabbing," "leaving," and "shirking" that loom so large
in Gilson's and Mnookin's view are less threatening. They are
constrained by socialization and honor.
Because Gilson and Mnookin start from a perspective that
stipulates a culture in which the only moral orientation is one of
selfish materialism and the only constraints are the impersonal
rules of the promulgated law, they are driven to find more ingenious explanations than the ones suggested by the ProgressiveFunctionalist Vision. Their approach to sharing directs attention
to the function that these distributive patterns might play in allowing selfish, materialistic people to "diversify" their human
capital investments and insure against the risk of decline of the
market value of their particular skills or practices. Their approach to "leaving" and "grabbing" directs attention to the way
that "firm specific capital" (long-term relations between the firm
and its clients) constrains such behavior.
The important contribution of this analysis is to show how
nonmarginal productivity distributions might arise even in a culture of selfish materialism. This demonstration is interesting because it appears that the culture of corporate practice is
becoming increasingly selfish and materialistic. Publications like
The American Lawyer (in addition to often providing some very
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good journalism) now perform the function that Grosvenor
Bibby's How to Put Pep In Salesmanship once performed for the stu-

dents of Dr. Roscoe Geake. In recent years, this kind of message
seems to have become increasingly influential with a growing
audience.
Like Dr. Geake, Gilson and Mnookin see their work not as
promoting a particular culture, but as a matter of science. They
want to "explain observed behavior" and to generate "testable
hypotheses." 8 However, Gilson and Mnookin try to avoid the
mistake that makes Dr. Geake's philosophy appear so transparently ideological: the arbitrary assumption that the premise of
selfish materialism accurately describes all relevant behavior.
They acknowledge two kinds of behavior that they feel cannot be
explained by their model-the absence of shirking among partners who are guaranteed a large draw regardless of productivity
and the refusal of lawyers like Lloyd Cutler with personal reputations that attract clients to "grab" or "leave." Although they do
not try to explain the second phenomenon, for the first they call
up their own version of functionalism or "firm culture. '39 Despite their qualifications, I think that Gilson and Mnookin exaggerate the power of their model and the explanations that they
derive from it.
First, Gilson and Mnookin sidestep at least two facts that seem
to pose problems for their model. One is the fact that, according
to Gilson and Mnookin, a large part of the "firm-specific capital"
(stable long-term client relations) that constrains "grabbing" and
"leaving" has accumulated because until recently corporate clients were "unsophisticated" in economic dealings with their lawyers. 40 These clients tended not to develop the expertise to
bring work in-house, to engage in comparitive shopping, and to
monitor closely financial arrangements with outside counsel.
Surely in the Gilson-Mnookin universe, it is at least anomalous
that such quintessentially rational and maximizing actors should
have behaved in such an irrational and nonmaximizing way for so
long. On the other hand, in the Progressive-Functionalist Vision,
the explanation for this phenomenon is obvious: Clients share a
normative view of the social order in which lawyering is presumptively a long-term personal relation, not a commodity to shop
38. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 1, at 376.
39. Id. at 321.
40. Id. at 363.
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Another anomaly that Gilson and Mnookin address in only a
question-begging manner is this: If lawyers adopt "sharing" selfishly and materialistically as a form of investment diversification,
then they would seem to have a strong incentive to preclude by
contract conduct such as "leaving" that would deprive some people of the gains of the initial bargain. Yet they do not enter into
such contracts. Gilson and Mnookin explain this fact by pointing
to another one: Such contracts are unenforceable. For example,
the Code and some state statutes prohibit covenants not to compete by lawyers. 4 2 However, this further fact-the unenforceability of contractual arrangements that facilitate diversificationitself demands explanation. Gilson and Mnookin treat nonenforceability as a constraint that they can use to explain the absence of contracts. But it is more plausible to view
nonenforcement as a form of lawyer behavior. Lawyers, after all,
have not been without influence over laws governing their profession. Indeed they are entirely responsible for the Code. That
lawyers should enact a rule that makes more difficult the kind of
risk-pooling that Gilson and Mnookin see them as striving for
and that serves no apparent material self-interest weighs against
their theory.
On the other hand, this behavior is readily explained in terms
of the Progressive-Functionalist premise that lawyers do not regard themselves as commodities. For the lawyer to accept compensation in return for an agreement not to practice would
involve treating her abilities as an asset and accepting compensation other than on the basis of a reasonable fee for the provision
of service. It would also preclude her from fulfilling her duty to
serve clients in need of assistance.
Second, where their observations are consistent with their
model, Gilson and Mnookin ignore that they are equally consistent with the Progressive-Functionalist model. They show no interest in Progressive-Functionalist explanations until they
encounter the nonshirking phenomenon that they feel their
model cannot explain. Then they invoke a Progressive-Function41. Of course, the clients' more recent economistic behavior seems more problematical in the Progressive-Functionalist vision than it does in the Gilson-Mnookin model.
However, there is a Progressive-Functionalist explanation for this behavior. See text accompanying note 45 infra.
42. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 1, at 335. See MODEL CODE, supra note 3, at DR
2-108.
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alist explanation for this phenomenon. But the Progressive-Functionalist approach is a sufficient explanation for all the sharing
phenomena that they discuss. It accounts for both the
nonmarginal distribution patterns for which they call up agency
and portfolio theory and the nonshirking phenomenon for which
they throw up their hands. Moreover, the "testable hypotheses"
that they generate involve the same ambiguity. For example, one
of their hypotheses is that firms with "sharing" practices will recruit more lawyers from elite law reviews, where (they assume)
antishirking values are instilled through socialization.43 But if the
test confirms this hypothesis, it will not necessarily confirm the
Gilson-Mnookin model. It would be at least as plausible to suppose that the law reviews instill, along with the antishirking
norms, a commitment to the professional principles of service
and peer solidarity and an indifference to marginal product
considerations.
Third, Gilson and Mnookin treat altruistic, idealistic behavior
as problematic in a peculiarly arbitrary way. Where they find
seemingly selfish, materialist behavior, they take its selfishness
and materialism for granted and concern themselves with the
specific institutional arrangements that such moral orientations
might explain. But when they find seemingly altruistic, idealistic
behavior, they call for explanations of altruism and idealism.
They congratulate economics on its capacity to point out, in instances in which its premises do not apply, "the direction further
inquiry should take." That direction turns out to be an inquiry
into "the process by which lawyers are socialized" to behave altruistically and idealistically.4 4 But economics never inquires into
the process by which people are socialized to behave selfishly or
materialistically; it simply stipulates these characteristics and attempts to derive predictions from them. It treats this moral orientation' 45as self-explanatory. Economics can be said to
"trigger
inquiry into the socialization of altruism and idealism
only to the extent that economics rests on a totally ungrounded
assertion that selfishness and materialism are more natural or
fundamental than other moral orientations.
Finally, Gilson and Mnookin treat people's attitudes ahistorically. They assume that the extent to which a person is selfish,
43. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 1, at 376-77.
44. Id. at 376.
45. Id.

January 1985] COMMENT ON NELSON/GILSON & MNOOKIN 583
materialistic, and risk averse does not vary with her circumstances. They are thus disabled a priori from considering any
explanation for the recent changes in corporate law practice that
relies on changes in people's attitudes. Now history is not the
strong suit of the Progressive-Functionalist Vision either, but its
marginally more complex notion of human nature gives it a little
more flexibility in historical explanation.
The Progressive-Functionalist Vision suggests that a person's
capacity for altruistic, idealistic behavior depends importantly on
attainment of a (in the case of lawyers, fairly high) threshold of
material welfare and on immunization from competitive pressures. Material insecurity and the experience of competition create a more general kind of risk aversion than the kind Gilson and
Mnookin discuss: a fear of nonreciprocal or nonsolidaristic behavior by others. Selfish material behavior represents a quest for
invulnerability to such dangers, a quest for a state of autarky in
which one does not have to depend on the good will of others.
Nevertheless, this kind of invulnerability has its costs even in narrow economic terms; it entails transaction costs and costs in
terms of lost cooperation. A person's willingness to bear these
costs depends on how averse she is to the risk of dependence on
others. The Progressive-Functionalist Vision suggests that this
kind of risk aversion declines sharply as the material threshold is
secured and that it is reduced by the experience of voluntary reciprocity and solidarity.
From this perspective, one might relate the increasing commercialization of practice that Gilson and Mnookin discuss to the
decline of threshold economic security and immunity from competitive pressures. This decline may be due in part to the elimination of some of the formal exemptions from the market that
have resulted from the Supreme Court's decisions rejecting minimum price regulation and advertising and solicitation prohibitions,4 6 though it seems more plausible to relate the decline to
the changes in client practices that Gilson and Mnookin emphasize (which are in turn due in some instances to recently intensified competitive pressure experienced by clients). Perhaps
another relevant development is the apparent increase in the
number of law graduates relative to jobs in corporate firms and
an increase within firms in the number of associates relative to
46. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virignia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773 (1975).
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partners. All these developments may have increased the difficulty of attaining a secure threshold of material welfare and have
subjected even those who have attained the threshold to intensified competition and insecurity in the course of getting there.
That these developments should be accompanied by increasingly
selfish and materialistic behavior both toward clients and toward
colleagues seems consistent with the Progressive-Functionalist
Vision.47
Gilson's and Mnookin's article is a pioneering effort to develop a scholarly perspective on law practice, but its analysis has
to be understood as ethics and politics as well as science.
Whether we call Lloyd Cutler's economic behavior "a contribution of human capital" to his partners or a refusal to commercialize a professional relation, whether we call taking a larger draw
for bringing in clients maximizing return on human capital or a
form of exploitation, does not depend on "observed behavior."
It depends in part on the subjective understandings that the actors involved impute to their own behavior and the behavior of
those with whom they interact 48-understandings that economics
has often committed itself to disregard. It also depends to an
ambiguous but important extent on the understandings that we
as observers impute to that behavior, including the understandings that arise from our own ethical and political commitments.
SharingAmong the Human Capitalistsis an episode in the cultural

battle portrayed in Lewis' novels. It contributes to the armory of
what the Progressives and Functionalists considered the enemy
culture a language that confers the prestige of science on that
culture and that understates its ambiguity, partiality, and
contingency.
IV.

CONCLUSION

At the risk of seeming perverse, I want to pay a little (but only
a little) more respect to the Progressive-Functionalist Vision than
Nelson and Gilson and Mnookin do. If the Vision is understood,
47. For an argument that economic decline increases competitiveness and, in turn,
selfish, materialistic behavior throughout the society, see P. BLUMBERG, INEQUALITY IN
AN AGE OF DECLINE (1980). For analyses by economists who try to treat selfishness and
materialism as historically contingent rather than as given and constant, see F. HIRCSH,
SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH (1976); A. HIRSCHMAN, SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS: PRIVATE INTEREST AND PUBLIC ACTION (1982).
48. See, e.g., P. WINCH, THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS RELATION TO PHILOSOPHY

(1958).
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not as a theory of functional necessity, but as an expression of a
political project, it has a modest role to play in understanding the
modem history of the profession. This interpretation is inspired
most basically by my own experience in corporate practice and by
conversations with colleagues and students about theirs, but it is
at least consistent with the evidence discussed by Nelson and by
Gilson and Mnookin.4 9
The Functionalist-Progressive political project is in important
respects a "collective mobility project,"' 50 a quest for economic
status and security. But it is also more than that. Elite corporate
law jobs have long been distinctively attractive to people who aspire to get more out of their jobs than material reward (but who
also want to be sure to get that), to people aspiring to achieve
economic status and security without surrendering to the culture
of Babbitry. Thus, the political project has involved two additional elements. One is the quest by professionals for an opportunity to express in their legal work a vision of the general social
good, a vision since World War II most often derived from center
liberal Progressive-New Deal reformism. The professionals have
sought to incorporate in their everyday practice an important
role in the vindication of this national political program. The
second element is an attempt to organize work to foster a culture
of peer solidarity. At different times and to different segments of
the corporate bar, these two nonmaterial goals have been perceived as requiring varying degrees of autonomy from corporate
clients. The norms of commitment to the liberal regulatory-welfare state and of peer solidarity in the elite workplace have often
been embraced within the business sector, but they have rarely
seemed as secure in business as in law.
Of course, this project has never been more than a partial suc49. This interpretation has also been influenced by several diverse accounts of professionalism. See, e.g., M. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM (1977); P. STARR, THE
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982); R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR
ORDER, 1877-1920, at 111-32 (1967); Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law": Fantastes and Practices of New 1ork City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS 51 (G.
Gawalt ed. 1984).
The professional political project is not easily mapped in terms of conventional distinctions between right and left. There are left and right versions of both the Progressive-Functionalist Vision and the critique of it. Moreover, some elements of the
critique-for example, the analysis of the profession's attempts to prohibit price competition and advertising as a form of illegitimate economic privilege-seem equally compatible with both right and left perspectives.
50. M. LARSON, supra note 49, at 66-79.
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cess, and it seems to be encountering increasing trouble. Few
lawyers ever achieved the ability of Brandeis to express their
public commitments in their work. As Nelson notes, much corporate law work is too routine to allow for much creativity, and
few clients demand or permit the kind of autonomy that Brandeis
exemplified. 5 ' Nevertheless, a substantial number of lawyers do
seem to have found some public dimension in both uncompensated pro bono and compensated work. Many lawyers have plausibly believed that the opportunities for achieving such a public
dimension have been greater in corporate law than in business.
The aspect of the professional project concerning workplace organization seems to have been more successful. Perhaps the
most striking political achievement of corporate lawyers in this
century is the establishment of "outside" counsel rather than
"inside" counsel or nonlawyers as the norm for a variety of significant corporate tasks. Although this organizational autonomy
has rarely meant the autonomy on substantive issues contemplated by the Brandeis model, it does seem to have had an impact
on the internal design of the legal workplace. Compared to their
clients, firms have been relatively free of bureaucratic organization and relatively effective in inducing a sense of collective responsibility and collegiality. (Of course, these achievements have
recently come under great pressure as a consequence of the developments mentioned in Part III.)
This interpretation differs from the orthodox ProgressiveFunctionalist Vision in denying that the public values of elite
legal professionals represent any universal or uncontroversial
"public interest" or set of "social needs." The recent dismantling of a variety of Progressive and New Deal reforms underscores a central point of the scholarly critiques of Progressivism
and Functionalism of the past two decades: Almost any area of
society can be organized in a variety of ways, and the choice
among them depends on controversial moral and political commitments, not on social necessity. In addition, the interpretation
also denies that the distinctive organizational structure that became the norm among elite firms from early in the century until
recently has been in any way necessary to the performance of the
tasks of corporate lawyering. Again, the recent developments
such as the move to in-house counsel and the bureaucratization
and commercialization of a variety of tasks in private practice
51.

Nelson, supra note 1, at 540.

January 1985]

COMMENT ON NELSON/GILSON & MNOOKIN 587

have confirmed that technical constraints do not mandate a specific form of work organization. 5 2 Yet the interpretation differs
from the more extreme critiques of the Progressive-Functionalist
Vision by treating the professed commitments to responsibility
and solidarity as real goals that motivate behavior, and to the ex53
tent they are unachieved, that generate disappointment.
If the Progressive-Functionalist Vision suggested that lawyers
were entitled to the experience of public commitment and solidarity in work as a matter of social necessity, the more extreme
critiques of the Vision seem to imply that lawyers' ambitions for
such experiences are either frivolous or futile or both. To treat
them as frivolous seems to run the risk of a view of human nature
considerably more narrow than that of the Pro gressive-Functionalist Vision. To treat tham as futile seems to run the risk of a
notion of social necessity as mysterious and dubious as those of
the Progressive-Functionalist Vision.

52. For a critique of the functionalist theme of social necessity, see Gordon, Critical
Legal Hstones, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984). At the Symposium, Robert Gordon illustrated
this point by emphasizing that two firms represented there were widely regarded as the
most successful in New York, yet had radically opposed compensation practices.
Cravath, Swaine & Moore exemplifies the "lock-step" seniority approach, while Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom exemplifies the marginal productivity approach.
53. The interpretation also differs from the Progressive-Functionalist account in
attributing the political project not to the profession as a whole, but to a narrow segment of it-the elite corporate bar. Both espousal of the Progressive-Functionalist Vision and the distinctive type of autonomous work organization that the vision prescribes
have been associated with big firm lawyers with a relatively secure corporate client base.
The large segment of the private bar composed of solo and small firm practitioners
serving small business and middle income individuals has been relatively indifferent to
the Progressive-Functionalist Vision and has practiced in more conventionally commercial settings. The novel aspect of the commercial ideals and practices described and
promoted in publications like The American Lawyer is not that they are being applied to
law practice, but that they are penetrating the precincts of elite corporate practice. SeeJ.
CARLIN, LAN ERS' ETHics (1966);J. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN (1962);J. HEINZ &

E.

LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR

137-66 (1983).

